What does RAND consider as the most realistic objective for deterring potential adversaries from attacking U.S. space capability?

• A. Deterring non-state adversaries from attacking satellite ground stations.
• B. Raising the thresholds of deterrence failure for non-reversible effects (destructive) attacks on satellites.
• C. Deterring cyberattacks on U.S. space systems.
• D. Deterring state adversaries from conducting reversible-effects attacks, such as jamming and dazzling.

Answer: (B)

Deterrence in space works best when the potential payoff for an attacker is outweighed by the extreme costs and consequences of the act. Destructive attacks on satellites cause irreversible, long-lasting damage that’s hard to undo, so making those attacks unlikely hinges on raising the deterrence failure threshold — in other words, ensuring that any attempt to destroy or permanently disable satellites faces overwhelming risk, cost, and retaliation. That makes the idea of attempting such damage unattractive to rivals.

Other threats, like reversible interference (jamming or dazzlement) or cyber intrusions, are generally easier for adversaries to test, adapt to, or mitigate, and the consequences aren’t as permanently crippling. Ground-station targets matter, but the most credible deterrence lever is to elevate the stakes for the most damaging, non-reversible attacks on space assets, so those attempts become not worth it in the adversary’s calculus.